← Összes podcast
2019/3. lapszám · Makrogazdaság és gazdaságpolitika

Financing and financial autonomy of the Érmellék and Berettyó regions' local authorities

Králik Lóránd-István

Megjelent: 2019 · Közgazdász Fórum, 2019/3. lapszám

„Mennyire függetlenek valójában a romániai önkormányzatok a központi kormányzattól a pénzügyi forrásaik tekintetében?”

Meghallgatom a podcastot

Bővebb beszélgetés · 8 perc
HU EN A podcast nyelve: magyar · EN: az angol változat még nem készült el
0:00-7:39

Megjelent: 2019 · Közgazdász Fórum, 2019/3. lapszám

A teljes cikk HU EN

OJS ↗

This English text is a machine translation of the original Hungarian article, made with a local AI model. The original is authoritative: read the original (Hungarian)

Közgazdász Fórum · Issue 3/2019

Financing and financial autonomy of the Érmellék and Berettyó regions' local authorities

Abstract. One of the most important elements of decentralisation is the financial autonomy of local authorities. This study aims to provide a brief overview of the financing system and actual financial independence of the local authorities in the Érmellék and Berettyó regions of Bihar County, Romania, examining the magnitude and structure of tax revenues, as well as the extent and proportion ofown-source revenues versus state transfers. The research reveals that financial autonomy in Romania is only partial; the central government is able to influence, and does influence, the level of local authority revenues, even on a year-to-year basis. Local authorities with low levels of own-source income are more vulnerable, whereas local authorities located near urbanisation hubs exhibit higher levels of financial independence and higher self-financing ratios.

Keywords: local authority revenues, local financing system, financial autonomy, local taxes

Published by: Hungarian Economic Association of Romania and the Hungarian Institute of the Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Babeș-Bolyai University ISSN: 1582-1986 www.econ.ubbcluj.ro/kozgazdaszforum

The financing and financial autonomy of the Érmellék and Berettyó regions' local authorities LÓRÁND-ISTVÁN KRÁLIK A key element of decentralisation is the financial autonomy of local authorities. This study aims to provide a brief overview of the financing system and actual financial independence of the local authorities in the Érmellék and Berettyó regions of Bihar County, Romania, by examining the magnitude and structure of tax revenues, as well as the extent and proportion of own-source revenues versus state transfers. The research revealed that financial autonomy in Romania is only partial; the central government is able to, and does, influence the level of local authority revenues, even on an annual basis. Local authorities with low levels of own-source income are more vulnerable, whereas local authorities located near urban hubs exhibit higher levels of financial independence and higher self-financing rates.

Keywords: local authority revenues, local financing system, financial autonomy, local taxes.

JEL codes: H71, H72.

Introduction

The post-1989 economic structural transformation, the concomitant economic development, and the 2007 EU accession necessitated the restructuring of public finances and, within that framework, community finances in Romania. Following the separation of political and economic power, an increasing number of responsibilities were transferred from the state government to the jurisdiction of local (communal, urban, municipal, and county) authorities. The Romanian government initiated this process following the regime change in view of the approaching EU accession.

In Western Europe, increasing emphasis has been placed on local autonomy since the 1980s, which manifested in the commencement of decentralisation processes and the gradual reduction of local authorities' financial dependence on the central state budget. The most important element of decentralisation is fiscal in nature; it includes the determination of local tax revenues (taxes and fees) previously collected by central budget organs, as well as the establishment of a legislative framework for the imposition of local taxes. Through this framework, local authorities can—within defined limits—determine the levels of imposed taxes and fees, as well as the charges payable for local services.

This study aims to provide a brief overview of the financing system and actual financial independence of the local authorities in the Érmellék and Berettyó regions of Bihar County, Romania, by examining the magnitude and structure of tax revenues, as well as the extent and proportion of own-source revenues versus state transfers.

Unfortunately, the Romanian research background on this topic is very sparse. Although many have addressed the legal aspects of the subject, far fewer studies have been undertaken to map its economic dimensions. Most researchers have generally focused on the allocation and structure of public funds, and the planning, execution, and auditing of state and local budgets; relatively few have delved into measuring the actual level of financial autonomy. Furthermore, research is significantly complicated by the constantly changing regulatory environment: between 2016 and 2019, for example, the annual Romanian budget law overrode the law on local authority finances regarding redistributed local authority resources every year with provisions differing from the previous year. This law, which had otherwise undergone significant changes several times since its creation in 2006, was subject to the prevailing political will regarding conceptions of public finance balance.

Literature Review

Regarding the legal background of municipal financing, since the enactment of Law no. 273/2006 on local public finances, several studies have addressed the issue, primarily detailing the principles transferred from the Council of Europe Charter. Among the most recent studies, the article by Gherghina (2017) must be highlighted; she emphasises that the law on local public finances is insufficient and that a code of local public finance would be required, as the financial dependence of municipalities on the central state remains too high due to the lack of an appropriate and transparent system of allocation criteria in the currently effective legislation. Gherghina (2017) effectively refutes the conclusions drawn by Manole (2010) following the enactment of the legislation—namely, that involving local financial directorates in the tax redistribution equalization process limits the opportunities for political interference and manoeuvring; according to her, the role of local financial directorates is actually limited to the execution of redistribution based on a formula developed annually (centrally directed) by the Ministry of Finance, which is under political control.

Oprea (2011) believes that local financial autonomy actually only refers to the capacity to levy local taxes, and that taxes redistributed or reallocated from the central budget do not contribute to autonomy. Profiroiu and Profiroiu (2007) argued, immediately after the Law on Local Public Finances entered into force, that an important criterion in redistribution should be the assessment and provision of the costs required to perform minimum public service tasks.

This system is applied in several European countries, including the United Kingdom (Oprea 2011). Dogariu (2010) presents a negative view regarding resource provision and local financial autonomy, arguing that the decentralisation process was on the right track until 2002, but an unfavourable trend emerged from 2003 onwards, when more tasks—previously performed by the central government—were transferred to municipalities, yet the resources required to provide these were only partially transferred; thus, in practice—despite the declaration of the principle of financial independence—the central authority exercises financial control. According to the author, this dependency is demonstrated by the decrease in the municipalities' self-financing rate from 29.37% in 1991 to only 4.5% in 2008.

Dumitrescu (2013) advocates for the expansion of financial autonomy and the increase of the financial responsibility of municipalities, even explicitly emphasising the necessity of fiscal federalism (*federalizare fiscală*)—which currently operates primarily at the level of federal states. Moldovan (2017) discusses the financial efficiency of municipalities, examining primarily the degree of local tax and fee collection. Marinescu and Todor (2014) assert that, due to the practice of public fund allocation, it is impossible to speak of genuine local autonomy in Romania, despite the principles of local public finances enshrined in law.

In Romanian-language Hungarian literature regarding local financial autonomy, László Geréb's (2003) writing in the study volume titled *Székelyföld* was pioneering, as was István Nagy's (2009) article on the municipal resources of the three counties of Szeklerland. The author of the latter study concluded that in Szeklerland, local taxes play a minor role in the budgets of local administration, as the level of taxes paid by enterprises is very low. In terms of tax equalisation, Harghita and Covasna are considered beneficiaries, whereas Mureș County receives less than the amount it contributes during redistribution.

Examining the efficiency of the redistribution of central taxes to local authorities, Rácz and Unger (2017) developed a multivariate linear regression model, which they use to demonstrate the extent to which economic and political practice aligns with the requirements of the literature and economic rationality in Romania and Hungary. Based on the authors' recommendations, taxation law should be amended, as a higher level of financial autonomy would be required for local authorities to perform their duties independently; by this, they mean that central taxes (personal income tax, VAT) should be entirely or partially converted into local taxes.

The weight of local authority revenues within the total (consolidated) state budget is approximately 30 per cent. Conducting calculations for the 2008–2012 period, Husman (2014) found that local authority revenues accounted for 24 per cent of the consolidated budget. The Court of Accounts' report on local public funds for 2016 (Curtea de Conturi a României 2017) establishes a ratio of 30.5 per cent between the local budget and the consolidated state budget, while the total revenues of local authorities account for 9 per cent of the gross domestic product. According to Eurostat data, the ratio of local authority revenues to GDP in Romania was 8.1 per cent in 2018. This remains below the EU average, which, if the federal-level revenue of the four federal states (Belgium, Germany, Spain, and Austria) is included, is 15.5 per cent. Among developed nations, the highest ratio in 2018 was that of Denmark (33.5%), but it was also above 20% in Sweden, Belgium, Germany, Spain, and Finland. Malta has the lowest indicator (0.3%), but it is also below 5% in Greece, Cyprus, and Ireland (Eurostat 2019).

The legal foundations of local financial autonomy

In Romania, the principle of financial autonomy for local authorities is established by the Law on Local Public Funds, Law no. 273 of 2006. This law also contains the revenue sources of local authorities, as well as the distribution algorithm for amounts redistributed from personal income tax and VAT. Unfortunately, the redistribution algorithm has been changed several times, depending on current political or national economic interests. According to the Romanian Law on Local Public Funds (Article 5 of Law 273/2006), the revenue sources of local authorities are as follows: own revenues, revenues redistributed from the state budget (primarily redistributed VAT), state subsidies (transfers), and donations. The most important sources of own revenues are: a) local taxes (property taxes on land and buildings paid by natural and legal persons, motor vehicle taxes), b) local fees (issuance of permits and certificates), c) income derived from property and services (rental or concession fees, sales, income from public services/economic activities), d) the portion of personal (central) income tax redistributed to the local authority, and e) funds obtained from EU or other financing programmes.

Most frequently, it is the principle of personal income tax redistribution that has undergone changes over the past 13 years. In its original form (which was in force between 2006 and 2011), 82 per cent of personal income tax remained with the local authorities (at least within the county) according to the following distribution: 47 per cent of the income tax was redistributed to the municipality, town, or commune local authority from which it was paid; 13 per cent went to the county councils; and 22 per cent was retained for intra-county equalisation, which was carried out by the county public funds administration according to an algorithm specified by law. Of this 22 per cent tax share, 27 per cent—representing 5.94 per cent of the total income tax revenue—was allocated to the county councils; the difference, namely 16.06 per cent, was re-divided into two parts: 12.85 per cent (80 per cent of the difference) was distributed by the county public funds administration among all local authorities operating within the county based on a formula that took into account the population of the local authority, its land area, and its economic strength based on tax payment criteria. The remaining portion of the difference (a 20 per cent residual value), representing 3.21 per cent of the personal income tax revenue, was distributed among the municipalities, towns, and communes operating within the county based on a decision by the county council; in this distribution, local development projects had to be taken into account according to the law, although, in most cases, the distribution at the county level was carried out subjectively, according to political considerations.

The restrictive measures of the Boc government did not spare the local authorities either: in December 2011, Emergency Government Decree no. 102 was issued, which was subsequently incorporated into law, significantly reducing the revenue sources of local authorities by lowering the level of redistributed personal income tax from 82 per cent to 71.5 per cent from 2012. Between 2012 and 2017, based on the amended statutory provisions, local, municipal, town, and commune authorities received only 41.75 per cent of the tax, counties received 11.25 per cent, and 18.5 per cent was allocated to equalisation—the principles of which remained unchanged, except in the case of Bucharest.

A more recent shift was brought about by the 2018 Budget Law (Law no. 2/2018), which reallocated 1.25 per cent from the portion of personal income tax intended for equalisation to the municipalities, towns, and communes, although the redistributed rate of 71.5 per cent remained unchanged. Thus, in 2018, municipalities, towns, and communes could dispose of 43 per cent of the income tax, while counties could dispose of 11.25 per cent, leaving 17.25 per cent for the budgetary equalisation process. In the budgetary equalisation process, counties could no longer distribute the specified income tax ratio, but rather an amount equivalent to 25 lei per capita (calculated based on the total population of the county) for development projects and the repayment of local authority debts.

The 2019 budget law completely rewrote the system of personal income tax redistribution: at the government's proposal, instead of the previous 71.5 per cent, the total personal income tax (100 per cent) was redistributed to the local authorities. For municipalities, towns, and communes, 60 per cent of the tax remained, 15 per cent was allocated to the financing of county councils, and 17.5 per cent went to the budgetary equalisation process. The remaining 7.5 per cent was distributed equally among the counties in amounts of 28.492 million lei, and the county councils were obliged to redistribute these amounts to local authorities for development projects. In 2018, more frugal local authorities, which had accumulated reserves in previous years, were excluded from the VAT redistribution or received only small amounts: the VAT redistributed for the performance of public services was reduced by 50 per cent of the reserves.

In Table 1, I have summarised the provisions of the four legislative acts—laws and emergency government ordinances—concerning the system of personal income tax redistribution. Table 1. Summary of personal income tax redistribution between 2006–2019 Administrative Units 2006–2011 2012–2017 2018 2019 Municipality, town, or commune 47.00% 41.75% 43.00% 60.00% County authority 13.00% 11.25% 11.25% 15.00% Budgetary equalisation, of which: 22.00% 18.50% 17.25% 17.50% County authority 5.94% 5.00% 4.66% 4.73% Municipality, town, or commune 12.85% 10.80% 10.07% 12.77% Local authority development projects 3.21% 2.70% 2.52% 7.50% Municipality, town, or commune 63.06% 55.25% 55.59% 80.27% total County authority total 18.94% 16.25% 15.91% 19.73% Total income tax 82.00% 71.50% 71.50% 100.00% Source: Own compilation based on Law 273/2006, Emergency Government Ordinance 102/2011, Law 2/2018, and Law 50/2019.

While not considered an own-source revenue, redistributed value-added tax (VAT) represents a significant part of local authority revenues, which local authorities receive primarily for the performance of public services, depending on their needs. To provide an idea of the magnitude of the amount, the redistributed VAT amounted to approximately 84.6 per cent of the redistributed income tax (71.5% of the total income tax) in 2018. Due to the existing equalisation system, municipalities, towns, and communes with more diverse own-source revenues receive little from the VAT, and in some rare cases, nothing at all, despite the fact that the public services required in their cases are the same.

Methodology and data

In this study, I analysed the degree of financial autonomy of 22 administrative units in northern Bihor (Érmellék and Berettyó-vidék) inhabited by Hungarians (possessing a Hungarian population rate of at least 30 per cent). The sampling was influenced by the fact that the selected administrative units are representative of the two investigated micro-regions—Érmellék and Berettyó-vidék; out of 27 local authorities, 22 are included in the sample. Among the 22 administrative units, there is one municipality with city status (Oradea) and two towns (Érmihályfalva and Ștei), as well as 19 communes: Bihor, Bihorfélegyháza, Bors, Diószeg, Érbogyoszló, Érkörtvélyes, Érszemjén, Érszőllős, Értarcsa, Hegyközcsatár, Hegyközpályi, Kiskereki, Paptamási, Szalacs, Szalárd, Szentjobb, Tóti, Vámosláz, and Vedresábrány. The administrative units are essentially the settlements of the Bihor Hungarian enclave, and every local authority currently has a Hungarian mayor.

In the case of the selected municipalities, I examined the revenue side of the 2019 initial local budgets during the data processing stage. Of the budgetary data from the 22 administrative units, I processed data from the official websites of the commune/city in 17 cases; however, in five cases, I had to contact the municipalities directly because the current budget had not yet been uploaded to their websites.

Furthermore, I used the official population data (as of 1 January 2019) from the Bihor County branch of the National Institute of Statistics (INS).

To ensure the results were comparable and to avoid distortion in the findings, I excluded from the total revenue: transfers received from local and regional development programmes (this affected 11 out of the 22 municipalities, often involving large-scale investments that account for 30–60 per cent of the budget), state subsidies (19 out of the 22 municipalities), and EU projects (8 out of the 22 municipalities). In the case of Szalacs commune, I performed a correction on the revenue side, as the sale of a high-value property would have distorted the real revenue. On the revenue side, I examined practically four sources: redistributed income tax (as own resource, account group 04), local taxes and fees (as own resource, including account groups 07, 10, 16, 18, 29, 30, 33, and 35), distributed VAT (as a budgetary resource, account 11. 02. 02), and VAT redistributed through the equalization system (as a budgetary resource, account 11. 02. 06).

Since the size of the administrative units varies significantly among the municipalities studied (the smallest has just over 1,300 inhabitants, while the largest has nearly 18,000), I prioritised per capita revenue and types of revenue, as well as ratios and relative figures, when selecting the indicators under investigation. I examined a total of six indicators.

Revenue 1. Revenue ratio = Redistributed income tax per capita 2. Income tax = Local taxes and fees per capita 3. Local tax indicator = VAT per capita 4. Budgetary support indicator = Own revenue (income tax + local tax) per capita 5. Financial autonomy indicator = Local taxes and fees / Revenue 6. Self-financing rate = Own revenue / Revenue. I mapped the results of the analysis onto regional maps to enable the identification of spatial correlations.

Research results

Firstly, I examined the revenue per capita of the 22 municipalities. I distinguished five categories in terms of revenue per inhabitant. The first, lowest-revenue municipal class consisted of those with revenue below 1,000 lei; the second category included those with 1,000–1,200 lei; the third with 1,200–1,500 lei; the fourth with 1,500–2,000 lei; and the fifth category comprised mayor's offices with revenue exceeding 2,000 lei.

Table or figure – see the PDF version of the issue for its exact content.

Table or figure – see the PDF version of the issue for its exact content.

Table or figure – see the PDF version of the issue for its exact content.

Table or figure – see the PDF version of the issue for its exact content.

Table or figure – see the PDF version of the issue for its exact content.

Table or figure – see the PDF version of the issue for its exact content.

Table or figure – see the PDF version of the issue for its exact content.

Table or figure – see the PDF version of the issue for its exact content.

Table or figure – see the PDF version of the issue for its exact content.

Table or figure – see the PDF version of the issue for its exact content.

Table or figure – see the PDF version of the issue for its exact content.

Table or figure – see the PDF version of the issue for its exact content.

Table or figure – see the PDF version of the issue for its exact content.

Table or figure – see the PDF version of the issue for its exact content.

Table or figure – see the PDF version of the issue for its exact content.

Table or figure – see the PDF version of the issue for its exact content.

Table or figure – see the PDF version of the issue for its exact content.

Table or figure – see the PDF version of the issue for its exact content.

Nagy, I. 2009. The municipal resources of the counties in Szeklerland. Tér és Társadalom 23(3), 185–197.

Oprea, F. 2011. Sisteme bugetare publice. Teorie şi practică. Bucureşti: Editura Economică.

Parliament of Romania 2006. Law no. 273 of 29 June 2006 regarding local public finances. Monitorul Oficial no. 618/2016. Parliament of Romania 2018. Law no. 2 of 3 January 2018 on the state budget for the year 2018. Monitorul Oficial no. 4/2018.

Parliament of Romania 2019. Law no. 50 of 15 March 2019 on the state budget for the year 2019. Monitorul Oficial no. 209/2019.

Profiroiu, A.–Profiroiu, M. 2007. Autonomia financiară a colectivităţilor locale din România – premisă a succesului descentralizării. Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences 19/2007, 77–85.

Rácz, B. G.–Unger, B. 2017. A comparative analysis of the efficiency of municipal tax transfers in Romania and Hungary. Közgazdász Fórum 20(130), 30–53.

Authors

  • Králik Lóránd-István

A szöveget automatikusan nyertük ki a PDF-ből; a táblázatok, ábrák és a pontos tördelés a lapszám PDF-változatában láthatók.